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Abstract
    There have been many theoretical and empirical researches on the 
effects of income distribution on economic growth. This paper uses 
Japanese prefectural panel data to empirically analyze how income 
distribution affects economic growth.
   Four measures of the income distribution are used in the system GMM 
estimations.  The Gini indices, income share of the third quintile and the 
ratio of the income share of the top decile and the 5th decile show that income 
inequality has negative effects on growth.  The ratio of the income share of 
the bottom decile and the 5th decile does not have statistically significant 
effects. Therefore, the estimation results show that the increased income 
inequality in recent Japan decreased the economic growth.
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21. Introduction
On the relationship between income distribution and economic growth, 
there have been many theoretical and empirical researches.  About the 
theoretical researches, income inequality decreases economic growth 
through the following three channels, according to Weil (2013) and Halter 
et.al. (2014).  First, income inequality inhibits economic growth by fiscal 
policy and less redistribution because more redistribution or higher tax 
decreases the efficiency of the economy (Perotti 1993, Alesina and Rodrick 
1994, Persson and Tabbelini). Secondly, inequality and capital market 
imperfection decreases human capital accumulation, because households 
who are liquidity-constrained decrease their spending on educations (Galor 
and Zeira 1993, Galor and Moav 2004). Thirdly, inequality decreases the 
political stability and makes it harder to make expectations on future
economic policies (Benabou 1996). 
On the other hand, inequality can affect growth positively by increasing
savings and the accumulation of physical capital, because people with 
higher income have higher savings rate. (Weil 2013, Kuznets 1955, Kaldor 
1955).  In addition, inequality can enhance the realization of high-return 
projects (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993) and increase R&D (Foellmi and 
Zweimullwe 2006), which enhances economic growth.  Therefore, the 
effects of income distribution on growth have both signs and the overall 
effect is an empirical problem.
     In recent Japan since 1980, statistics such as the Gini indices showed 
that inequality increased, and active discussion on this possibility of the
increase in income inequality was conducted (Otake 2005, Tachibanaki 2004, 
2006).  It is indicated that about half of the increase in the Gini indices was 
caused by the population aging and the increase of households with only one 
or two persons, but consumption inequality within the same generations was 
also observed, and it indicates income inequality increased to some extent
(Ohtake 2005).  Also, the increase of inequality people felt became social 
problem for several years, and recent increase of the maximum rate for 
income taxes and the increase of inheritance taxes can be considered as the 
increase of government’s income redistribution.  Such increase or decrease 
in income inequality can affect economic growth, and that effect is estimated 
in this research with Japanese regional data for the first time, to the best of 
my knowledge.  
3In figure 1, the transition of the Gini index from two major surveys in 
Japan are shown.  The red line shows the Gini index on the income before 
redistribution in the Survey on the redistribution of income, and it has been 
increasing sharply.  However, the Gini index on the income after 
redistribution in the same Survey shown by the blue line increased more 
slowly during 1980-2002 and did not show constant increase after 2003.  
Also, if we look at the violet line which shows the Gini index of the pretax 
income in the National Survey of family income and expenditure, it is lower
but increasing since 1979.  
     In the existing empirical researches, the estimated effects of income 
distribution on economic growth are different, depending on data and the
estimation methods.  Lately, Deininger and Square’s (1996) panel 
cross-country dataset and regional panel data within one country are widely
used in the empirical researches.  While most cross-country studies found a 
negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth, 
Forbes (2000) and Li and Zou (1998) used Deininger and Square’s panel data 
and found positive relationship between inequality and growth.
     Weil (2013) explains the reason why it is difficult to find out the effect 
of income distribution on economic growth is that the effect may depend on a 
county’s stage of growth, as well as other factors such as whether a country is 
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4open to capital flows from abroad.  Actually, Barro (2000) found that 
inequality increases growth within rich countries, but inhibits it in poorer 
countries.  
     Recently, Panizza (2002) and Partridge (1997) conducted empirical 
researches with U.S. states panel data, Simoes et. al. (2013) used Portuguese 
regional panel data, and Kurita and Kurosaki (2011) used Thai and the 
Philippine regional panel data.  The research in Panizza (2002) found 
evidence in support of a negative relationship between inequality and growth, 
using a data of the 48 states of the continental US for the 1940-1980 period.
    In the research using panel data of U.S. states, Partridge (1997) found 
out that inequality measured with the Gini index has positive and 
significant effect on growth, and that inequality measured with the income 
share of the third quintile has negative and significant effect on growth. 
Partridge (1997) and Panizza (2002) both used the same two measures of 
income distribution, the Gini indices and the income share of the third 
quintile.  This research used four measures of inequality including these
same two measures on the Japanese prefectural panel data and found that 
inequality had negative effects on growth. Partridge (1997) explains his
result the median voter theory, and this theory can also be applied to some of
the results from Japanese data.
     In addition, Simoes et. al. (2013) and Voitchovsky (2005) analyzed the 
effects of different distribution measures on growth with cross-country panel 
data.  In addition to the general Gini indices, they used income percentile
data of the top income group and the bottom income group to analyze their 
effects on income, and found different effects from different measures of 
inequality.  Thus, in this research, I analyzed the effects of the Gini indices 
and the income share of the third quintile at first, then, I also investigated 
the effects of the income share of the top 10% income group and the bottom 
10% income group.
     Using a regional panel data within one country has an advantage that 
the county’s stage of growth, other factors such as whether a country is open 
to capital flows from abroad, and the measurement method of inequality are 
the same in the data.  Therefore, in this paper, prefectural panel data from 
Japan is used, following the recent empirical researches.  Since such 
research using Japanese panel data has been conducted for the first time, it 
is important to find out what kind of effects this data shows.
5     This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 illustrates data set; 
Section 3 presents the results of estimation; Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
     In this paper, Japanese prefectural panel date is used.  The summary 
statistics is shown in table 1, and the correlation matrix is shown in table 2.
     Data is a panel for 47 prefectures for the 1980 (1979 for the distribution 
variables) – 2010 (2009), every 5 years for 6 periods.  growth5 is the 
five-year average annual growth rate from the base year.  LogIncome is the 
natural log of the average per capita income in prefectures. These data are 
obtained or calculated from “the Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts”
released by the Cabinet Office.
     Gini is the Gini index about the yearly income and Q3 is the income 
share of the third quintile in 47 prefectures.  90/50 is the ratio of the income
                      Table1 Summary Statistics
No.of obs. Average S.E. Minimum Maximum
growth5 282 0.0117 0.0245 -0.0375 0.0654 
growth10 141 0.0145 0.0253 -0.0200 0.0627 
LogIncome 329 3.3730 0.1110 3.0790 3.6646 
Gini 282 0.2523 0.0850 0.0590 0.3800 
Q3 282 0.1769 0.0045 0.1565 0.1892 
90/50 282 2.7151 0.2499 2.1666 4.0816 
10/50 282 0.4024 0.0344 0.3067 0.5091 
HighSchool 282 41.1663 5.8431 25.0151 56.8238 
College 282 20.1745 8.2518 7.3391 47.6881 
Agriculture 282 10.2585 6.0017 0.4000 26.6000 
Urban 282 48.5993 18.5704 23.4000 98.0000 
Old 282 16.7283 4.6685 6.1636 27.1352 
Manufacturing 282 20.8058 6.5005 4.9178 34.6487 
FinanInsRealEst 282 3.3291 0.9038 2.0771 7.0241 
Government 282 3.7017 0.8064 2.2581 6.7096 
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7share of the top income decile and the 5th income decile, and 10/50 is the 
ratio of the income share of the bottom income decile and the 5tn income 
decile in prefectures.  
The Gini indices data is obtained from “the National Survey of Family 
Income and Expenditure.”  The data on the income share of the third 
quintile, 90/50 and 10/50 are calculated from the yearly household pretax 
income share by deciles in “the National Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure.1”      
Table 2 shows that the correlation between the Gini index and Q3 is 
-0.378.  The Gini index is the established measure of income distribution, 
and the negative correlation with the Gini index shows that Q3 is the 
measure of income equality.
     Also, the figure 2 shows the change of the income share of the third 
quintile (Q3) at the horizontal axis, and the change of the income share of the
first and second quintiles (Q1 + Q2) and that of the richer fourth and fifth 
quintiles (Q4 + Q5) at the vertical axis.  This figure shows that when the 
income share of the middle class increases, income share of the poorer two 
quintiles tend to increase and the income share of the richer two quintiles 
tend to decrease.  Therefore, we can interpret that the overall income 
inequality tends to decrease when Q3 increases.
In Figure 3, the correlation between the change of Q3 and the change of 
the ratio of income share of the top decile and the 5th decile (90/50), and the 
correlation between the change of Q3 and the change of the ratio of income 
share of the bottom decile and the 5th decile (10/50) are shown.  Table 2 
shows us that the correlation between Q3 and 90/50 is -0.940 and the 
correlation between Q3 and 10/50 is 0.230.  Therefore, the income share of 
the middle quintile has strong negative correlation with the income share of 
the top decile, and has week positive correlation with the income share of the 
bottom decile.  Figure 3 also shows that the Q3 and the 90/50 has negative 
correlation, and the Q3 and the 10/50 has week positive correlation.  This 
also indicates that the Q3 is the measure of equality.
                                                  
1 The data of the Gini indices and the yearly household pretax income share by deciles 
in “the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure” are data about the 
households who have two persons or more.  The data on the number of household 
members in each prefecture is not available, so the household income is used in this 
research instead of per-capita income adjusted by the equivalence scale.
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9As for the other variables, following Panizza (2002), Partridge (1997) 
and Perotti (1996), the first one is the average skills of the labor force 
(HighSchool is the percentage of the population over 15 years old that have 
graduated from high school, but not a college, and College is the percentage 
that graduated from two- or four-year college or graduate school) and they
are from “the employment status survey.”  The next variables are the degree 
of urbanization (Urban measures the fraction of the population that lives in 
urban areas), age structure (Old measures the percentage of the population 
above 65 years of age), and industrial structure (Agriculture, Manufacturing, 
FinanInsRealEst, Government measure the percentage of the population 
employed in agriculture; construction; manufacturing; finance, insurance, 
and real estate; and government). Agriculture and Urban are the data from
the “Statistical Indicator of Social Life –Prefectural Indicator－” by the
Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.  Old, 
Construction, Manufacturing, FinanInsRealEst, Government are from “the 
Population Census.”
3. Estimations
    In this section, the estimation results are shown.  The estimated 
model is the following:
ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ(௧,௧ାହ),௜ = ߚݕ௧,௜ + ߛܦܫܴܵܶܫ௧ିଵ,௜ + ߠܺ௧,௜ + ߙ௜ + ߝ௧,௜  (1)
In this equation, ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ(௧,௧ାହ) is the average annual growth rate of 
prefectural income from year t to t+5, ݕ௜ is prefecture i’s natural log of 
income per capita,	ܦܫܴܵܶܫ௧ିଵ,௜	is a variable capturing income distribution 
(measured using the Gini index, the income share of the third quintile, 90/50, 
and 10/50) in year t-1 and ܺ௜ is the prefecture i’s matrix of controls.  
As the Kuznets curve argues, the growth or income level also affects 
income distribution, so there is an inverse causality from growth to income 
inequality.  However, in this research, only the effect of inequality on 
growth is estimated as the first step.  In order to clarify this causality, the 
variables on income distribution are used with one-year lag.
     The matrix ܺ௜ includes stock of human capital (HighSchool and 
College), the degree of urbanization (Urban), age structure (Old) and the 
initial industrial mix of the prefecture (Agriculture, Manufacturing 
10
FinanInsRealEst, Government).  ߙ௜ denotes the prefecture i’s unobservable 
prefecture-specific effect, and ߝ௧,௜ is the remainder stochastic disturbance 
term.
The independent variables of equation (1) contain the lagged dependent 
variable (prefectural income) and this dynamic panel data structure may 
make the fixed effects estimators biased2 (Panizza 2002; Caselli et al. 1996; 
Judson and Owen 1999).  Also, we have data of 6 periods for 5 years each, 
and this small number of samples makes the system GMM estimation 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) more 
desirable than the first-difference GMM developed by Arellano and 
Bond(1991).  Therefore, in this research, the system GMM estimation is 
conducted as in the many recent literatures (Voitchovsky 2005, Kurita and 
Kurosaki 2011, Castello-Climent, A., 2010 etc.)
The system GMM estimation results with Q3 and the Gini indices are 
shown in table3. In table 3, the estimation results without the control 
variables are shown in the first two columns, and the results with the control 
variables are in the next two columns, and the results with the control 
variables and the period dummies are shown in the last two columns.  In all 
estimation results, the changes of Q3 have positive effects on changes of
growth when they are statistically significant, and changes in the Gini 
indices have negative effects on changes in growth when they are 
statistically significant.  
Therefore, both of the income of the third quintile and the Gini indices 
indicate that income inequality decreases the economic growth.  The
difference between the two measures is that the Gini indices measure the 
overall income distribution, although the income share of the third quintile 
measures the income or well-being of the middle class of the economy.  In 
addition, we should note that in these estimations the population aging is 
controlled by the variable Old (the share of the residents who are older than 
65 years), and Old does not have statistically significant effects on growth3.
                                                  
2 The OLS, the random effects and the fixed effects estimations are also made, and the 
F-tests and Hausman tests results show that the fixed effects estimation is the 
desirable among these three estimation methods.  The fixed effects estimation results 
are biased and are not reported in this paper.
3 Ohtake and Sano (2009) used prefectural panel data and median voter theory and 
found out that population aging has negative effects on public spending on education.  
Therefore, the higher share of old people can affect education (College) negatively and 
results in lower economic growth.  
11
     As for Q3, Partridge (1997) used the U.S. state panel data and obtained 
the same positive effects.  Partridge explained this result with a positive 
relationship between the median voter’s relative well-being and economic 
growth as suggested by the Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994).
     The Q3 results from Japanese data can also be explained with the
median voter theory.  According to the median voter theory, the decision 
over the tax rate is reached under simple majority rule in voting.  Then, the 
tax rate or the policy chosen will be the one preferred by the person with the 
median level of pretax income, who is often referred to as the median voter. 
(Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Weil 2013)
Under this median voter theory, if the income share of the median voter 
who is included in the third quintile increases, s/he demands less 
redistribution.  Then, the tax rate will be lower and there will be less 
inefficiency caused by tax and redistribution, which leads to higher economic 
growth rate.  
Although Japanese prefectural governments are more centralized than 
U.S. state governments, Doi (1999) empirically showed that the median voter 
theory also applies to Japanese prefectural governments.  In Japan, 
prefecture revenues are almost entirely controlled by the central government, 
with the rates and sources of Local Taxes being basically determined by 
national laws such that prefectural governments have limited discretion over 
them.  However, governors petition the central government as the agents of 
the median voters and that the central government accordingly distributes 
inter-regional grants to each prefectural government in a manner reflecting 
prefectural election results, i.e., the jurisdictional preference of the median 
voter.  The probability of reelection for an incumbent governor increased as 
the difference between the actual level of expenditure and the estimated 
level desired by the median voter decreased ; a finding which supports the 
interpretation of the median voter hypothesis in Japanese prefectures.    
     As for the Gini indices, the negative effects on growth can be caused by 
the lower investment in human capital such as education, more 
redistribution and more inefficiency, and political instability in Japan.  
About the political instability, Japan had five short-lived cabinets, each of 
which lasted for less than one year since 2006.  These often changed 
cabinets make the government policies unstable and make it harder for 
12
private agents to invest aggressively.
     About other independent variables, if the initial income level is higher, 
growth rate is lower, which means that prefectural per capita incomes tend
to converge.  The human capital measured by the shares of college 
graduates among residents has positive effects on growth, which is the 
expected positive effect of human capital.  In addition, larger share of 
Table3 System GMM Estimations
No controls Controls Controls and Period Dummies
LogIncome -0.314 -0.258 -0.331 -0.596 -0.598 -0.599 -0.574 -0.582 -0.575 
(.0440)*** (.0240)*** (.0442)*** (.0632)*** (.0635)*** (.0651)*** (.0676)*** (.0678)*** (.0684)***
Q3 0.386 -0.382 0.413 0.277 0.387 0.274 
(.2193)* (.3508) (.1900)** (.3269) (.1964)** (.3316)
Gini -0.177 -0.270 -0.125 -0.055 -0.114 -0.048 
(.0692)** (.1143)** (.0610)** (.1074) (.0641)* (.1102)
HighSchool -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007)
College 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0009)** (.0008)** (.0009)** (.0011)* (.0011)* (.0011)*
Urban -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0009) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
Old 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(.0014) (.0014) (.0015) (.0020) (.0020) (.0020)
Agriculture 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
(.0020) (.0020) (.0021) (.0022) (.0022) (.0022)
Manufacturing 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0016)* (.0016) (.0016) (.0017) (.0016) (.0018)
FinanInsRealEst 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 
(.0064)*** (.0060)*** (.0066)*** (.0067)*** (.0066)*** (.0068)**
Government 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 
(.0093) (.0093) (.0095) (.0098) (.0098) (.0100)
Constant 1.164 0.739 1.421 1.881 1.743 1.809 1.833 1.755 1.735 
(.1528)*** (.1105)*** (.2023)*** (.2380)*** (.2353)*** (.2711)*** (.2480)*** (.2402)*** (.2874)***
N. obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%;、** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
13
employment in manufacturing, finance, insurance and real estate raised the 
growth rates.  This may mean that these industries had higher growth
rates of income or productivity.
     Next, I used the different income distribution measures to estimate 
their effects on growth.  Specifically, I used the ratio of the income share of 
the top decile and the 5th decile (90/10) and the ratio of the income share of 
the bottom decile and the 5th decile (10/50) to analyze how the distribution 
change in the top income and the bottom income affect the growth.  This is 
because the existing researches such as Halter, et. al. (2014), 
Castello-Climent (2010) and Voitchovsky (2005) have shown that the 
different parts of income distribution such as the income share of the top and 
bottom can have different effects on growth from the general distribution 
shown by the Gini and the income share of the middle class shown by Q3.  
     The system GMM estimation results are in table 4 to 6.  Table 4 shows 
the estimation results without the control variables, table 5 shows the 
results with the control variables, and the table 6 shows the results with the 
control variables and the period dummies.  In all tables, we find that the
income share of the bottom decile does not have statistically significant 
effects, although the income share of the top decile mainly has negative 
  
Table4 System GMM Estimations: No Controls
10/50 90/50 Gini and      Gini and      10/50 and   Gini, 10/50
10/50   90/50 90/50 and 90/50
LogIncome -0.287 -0.262 -0.335 -0.346 -0.287 -0.348 
(.025)*** (.0238)*** (.0457)*** (.0446)*** (.0250)*** (.0473)***
10/50 0.031 0.016 0.027 -0.036 
(.0344) (.0352) (.0342) (.0447)
90/50 -0.007 0.014 -0.006 0.020 
(.0043) (.0090) (.0043) (.0117)*
Gini -0.143 -0.354 -0.461 
(.0718)** (.1493)** (.1990)**
Constant 0.912 0.956 1.142 1.329 0.971 1.323 
(.0841)*** (.0893)*** (.1534)*** (.1570)*** (.0904)*** (.1683)***
N. obs. 141 141 141 141 141 141
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%;、** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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Table5. System GMM Estimations: With Controls
Gini 10/50 90/50 Gini and      Gini and      10/50 and   Gini, 
10/50
10/50   90/50 90/50 and 90/50
LogIncome -0.596 -0.586 -0.605 -0.596 -0.606 -0.605 -0.607 
(.0632)*** (.0638)*** (.0632)*** (.0641)*** (.0653)*** (.0644)*** (.0670)***
10/50 0.003 -0.013 0.005 0.020 
(.0321) (.0330) (.0319) (.0404)
90/50 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.016 
(.0038)** (.0090) (.0039)** (.01116)
Gini -0.125 -0.129 0.045 0.114 
(.0610)** (.0641)** (.1454) (.1834)
HighSchool -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.00058) (.00058) (.00060)
College 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0009)** (.0009)** (.0008)** (.0009)** (.0009)** (.0009)** (.00098)
Urban -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0009) (.00092) (.0008) (.0009) (.00092) (.00091) (.00094)
Old 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(.0014) (.0014) (.0014) (.0015) (.00157) (.00147) (.00166)
Agriculture 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0020) (.00212) (.0020) (.0021) (.0021) (.0021) (.00212)
Manufacturing 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(.0016)* (.0016)* (.0015)* (.0016)* (.0016)* (.0016)* (.0016)*
FinanInsRealEst 0.021 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024 
(.0064)*** (.0062)*** (.0061)*** (.0065)*** (.0066)*** (.00623)*** (.0066)***
Government 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 
(.0093) (.0095) (.0093) (.0095) (.0095) (0.0095) (.0096)
Constant 1.881 1.798 1.881 1.893 1.886 1.877 1.872 
(.2380)*** (.2389)*** (.2355)*** (.2442)*** (.2423)*** (.2409)*** (.2459)***
N. obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%;、** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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Table6. System GMM Estimations:  With Controls and Period Dummies
Gini 10/50 90/50 Gini and      Gini 
and      
10/50 
and 
  Gini, 
10/50
10/50   90/50 90/50
and 90/50
LogIncome -0.574 -0.569 -0.592 -0.570 -0.580 -0.591 -0.573 
(.0676)*** (.0671)*** (.0679)*** (.0689)*** (.0679)*** (.0694)*** (.0696)***
10/50 0.002 -0.013 0.004 0.027 
(.0329) (.0339) (.0330) (.0411)
90/50 -0.009 -0.013 -0.009 -0.019 
(.0039)** (.0092) (.0040)** (.0114)*
Gini -0.114 -0.117 0.072 0.176 
(.0641)* (.0670)* (.1493) (.1890)
HighSchool -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007)
College 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0011)* (.0011) (.0011)* (.0011)* (.0011)* (.0011)* (.0012)*
Urban -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.00096)
Old 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(.0020) (.0020) (.0020) (.0020) (.0020) (.0020) (.0021)
Agriculture 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
(.0022) (.0022) (.0022) (.0022) (.0022) (.0022) (.0022)
Manufacturing 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
(.0017) (.0017) (.0016) (.0018) (.0017) (.0017) (.0018)
FinanInsRealEst 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 
(.0067)*** (.0067)*** (.0066)*** (.0068)*** (.0068)*** (.0066)*** (.0068)***
Government 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.011 
(.00983) (.0101) (.0098) (.0102) (.0100) (.0102) (.0102)
Constant 1.833 1.783 1.867 1.834 1.836 1.860 1.780 
(.2480)*** (.2443)*** (.2456)*** (.2546)*** (.2469)*** (.2505)*** (.2505)***
N. obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%;、** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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effects on growth when they are statistically significant.  The Gini indices 
have negative effects on growth when they are significant, as in the previous 
estimations.  Therefore, in these estimations, we find that the inequality at 
the top income and the overall income inhibits economic growth.  This 
result has the opposite sign from the existing literature which uses the 
cross-country panel data (Castello-Climent 2010, Voitchovsky 2005).
  One of the explanations of this negative effect could be that under low 
growth rate and low rate of wage increase, increase in the income share of 
top 10% makes people feel more inequality than the actual level, which may 
lead to demand for more redistribution.  The second possibility is that 
richest 10% people have more political power than others and they may be
less willing to pay for the government expenditure on public educations, 
because they tend to use more private schools.  The third possibility is that 
higher income share of top 10% people may make these rich individuals or 
firms to move their residents to foreign tax haven such as Singapore or Hong 
Kong, which decreases the efficiency of the economy and the tax revenue of 
the government.  
     Finally, the results of the first-difference GMM are shown in table 7 to 
9 in order to see the sensitivity to changes in the estimation methods and 
instrument set.  In these two tables, the estimated coefficients on the four 
distribution variables such as the Gini indices, Q3, 90/50, 10/50 have the 
same sign as the results in the system GMM estimation.  Although the 
coefficients estimates on some control variables are different, the main 
results about the effects of inequality on growth are unchanged, and it 
suggests the estimate results in this research are robust.
     Although the estimation results in this research show that income 
inequality decreased economic growth in Japan, how income inequality 
affected growth need to be investigated further.  For example, the effects of 
inequality through public spending on education or college enrolment rates
are planned to be estimated as the next step.
4. Conclusion
     In this paper, the prefectural panel data of Japan from 1979 to 2010 is 
used to investigate how income inequality affects economic growth.  In the 
system GMM estimations, income inequality affects five-year growth 
negatively and statistically significantly, if inequality is measured with the 
17
Gini indices and the income share of the third quintile.    
The estimation results with Q3 can be explained with the median voter 
theory, because if the income share of the third quintile increases, the income 
of the median voter also increases and less redistribution will be chosen, 
which decrease inefficiency and enhances growth.  The negative effects of 
the Gini indices can be explained with less investment in human capital, 
more redistribution and more inefficiency, and political instability.  As for 
the estimations with the income share of the top decile, we find that 
inequality decreases growth, and the income share of the bottom decile does 
not affect growth rate.  The effect of inequality through education is 
planned to be estimated in future research,
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Table7. Sensitivity analysis: First-difference GMM Estimations
No controls Controls Controls and Period dummies
LogIncome -0.343 -0.421 -0.440 -0.515 -0.552 -0.584 -0.740 -0.739 -0.741 
(.0085)*** (.0191)*** (.0210)*** (.038)*** (.041)*** (.048)*** (.050)*** (.047)*** (.048)***
Q3 0.497 0.556 0.208 0.396 0.297 0.158 
(.2145)** (.2621)** (.151) (.2284)* (.1592)* (.2227)
Gini -0.154 -0.031 -0.013 0.067 -0.094 -0.057 
(.0562)*** (.0759) (.0388) (.0606) (.0471)** (.06631)
HighSchool 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0011 
(.0003) (.0003) (.0002)* (.00061)** (.00061)* (.00059)*
College 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(.0006) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (0.0005) (.0005)
Old -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.001)** (.001)** (.001)** (.001)**
Agriculture -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(.0013) (.0014) (.0013) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
Manufacturing 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0010) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)** (.0009)** (.0009)*
FinanInsRealEst 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.006 
(.0060) (.0059) (.0058) (.0053) (.0051) (.0054)
Government 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
( .0073) (.0068) (.0067) (.0058) (.0059) (.005)
Constant 1.730 1.856 1.776 2.476 2.560 2.550 
(.173)*** (.165)*** (.178)*** (.227)*** (.221)*** (.241)***
p-value¹ 0.006*** 0.214 
N. obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%;、** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
¹ Wald joint test on the inequality variable coefficients in the regression
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Table8. Sensitivity analysis: First-difference GMM Estimations with Controls
Gini 10/50 90/50 Gini and      Gini and      10/50 and   Gini, 
10/50
90/50   10/50 90/50 and 90/50
LogIncome -0.618 -0.601 -0.618 -0.629 -0.616 -0.616 -0.628 
(.0631)*** (.0633)*** (.062)*** (.0654)*** (.064)*** (.064)*** (.066)***
10/50 -0.008 -0.021 -0.003 0.004 
(.0311) (.0319) (.0311) (.0401)
90/50 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.011 
(.0039)** (.0088) (.004)** (.0112)
Gini -0.130 0.004 -0.135 0.032 
(.0637)** (.1440) (.066)** (.18627)
HighSchool 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0006) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.0007) (.0007)
College 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009)* (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)* (.0009)
Urban -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0009) (.0009) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
Old 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(.0014) (.0014) (.0014) (.0015) (.0015) (.0014) (.0016)
Agriculture 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(.0021) (.0021) (.0020) (.0021) (.0021) (.0021) (.0021)
Manufacturing 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(.0015)* (.0016)* (.0015)* (.0015) (.0016) (.0016)* (.0016)*
FinanInsRealEst 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 
(.0082) (.0082) (.0082) (.0083) (.0083) (.0082) (.0083)
Government 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.016 
(.0091) (.0094) (.0091)* (.0092)* (.0093)* (.0093)* (.0094)*
Constant 2.015 1.994 1.977 2.033 2.025 1.968 2.031 
(.254)*** (.2593)*** (.2503)*** (.2580)*** (.260)*** (.256)*** (.2619)***
p-value¹ 0.054* 0.128 0.082* 0.144 
N. obs. 141 141 141 141 141 141 141
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%;、** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
¹ Wald joint test on the inequality variable coefficients in the regression
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Table9. First-difference GMM Estimations With Controls and Period Dummies
Gini 10/50 90/50 Gini and      Gini and      10/50 
and 
  Gini, 
10/50
90/50   10/50 90/50 and 90/50
LogIncome -0.739 -0.732 -0.738 -0.740 -0.741 -0.737 -0.742 
(.0479)*** (.0496)*** (.0497)*** (.0484)*** (.0491)*** (.0499)*** (.0493)***
10/50 0.002 -0.010 0.003 -0.007 
(.0262) (.0260) (.0254) (.0353)
90/50 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 
(.0029)* (.0061) (.0029)* (.0082)
Gini -0.095 -0.082 -0.100 -0.096 
(.0471)** (.0993) (.0496)** (.1406)
HighSchool -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0011 
(.00061)* (.00061)** (.00062)** (.00061)* (.0006)* (.0006)** (.00059)*
College -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.00065) (.0005) (.0006) (.00065)
Urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(.0005) (.0005) (.00058) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005)
Old -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(.0014)** (.0015)** (.0015)** (.0015)** (.0015)** (.0015)** (.0015)**
Agriculture 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(.0011) (.0012) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.00115)
Manufacturing 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0009)** (.0009)** (.0009)** (.0010)* (.00096)** (.00093)** (.00099)*
FinanInsRealEst 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 
(.0051) (.0054) (.0053) (.0054) (.0051) (.0053) (.00529)
Government 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
(.0059) (.0054) (.0059) (.0059) (.0058) (.0059) (.0058)
Constant 2.560 2.534 2.541 2.571 2.573 2.535 2.587 
(.2213)*** (.2214)*** (.2235)*** (.2217)*** (.2229)*** (.2245)*** (.2241)***
N. obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%;、** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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